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Abstract-If an income tax is converted to a consumption tax of equal progressivity 
and equal yield. within each income class disposable income will be shifted from “low 
savers” to “high savers.” The .impact of this “horizontal redistribution” has been 
neglected in previous analyses which focused on the interest elasticity of saving. We 
prove that “horizontal redistribution” must raise aggregate saving if persons possess 
“disposable income saving functions” (with certain properties and not all identical). 
We calculate that. if constant saving rate functions generated actual cross-section data 
in the U. S. in 1963, then tax conversion would have raised aggregate household saving 
by approximately 11% through the “horizontal redistribution effect.” 
The proposal to convert the personal income tax to a personal consumption (expenditure) 
tax has recently received attention. Two studies-the U. S. Treasury’s Blueprints fur 
Basic Tar Reform (1977), and the U. K. Institute for Fiscal Studies’ The Structltre and 
Reform of Direct Taxation (The Meade Committee Report) (1978)-have endorsed the 
conversion, concluding it would be both feasible and desirable. Consumption has been 
regarded as the ideal tax base by several distinguished economists, including John Stuart 
Mill, Alfred Marshall, Irving Fisher, A. C. Pigou, and Nicholas Kaldor. 
Much of the economic analysis of the tax substitution has focused on the implications 
of the change in the ratio of future to present consumption that each household would 
face; or equivalently, the change in the net (after-tax) return to saving. The interest elas- 
ticity of saving has received re-examination. 
Another aspect of the tax substitution, however, has been largely neglected. Conversion 
of the income tax to a consumption tax of “equal progressivity” would shift disposable 
(after-tax) income within each income class from “low savers” to “high savers.” This 
“horizontal redistribution” might, itself, significantly increase aggregate saving. This 
paper begins the exploration of this previously neglected aspect of the consumption tax. 
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. 1 analyzes the horizontal redistribution effect 
on the assumption that each person possesses a constant saving rate out of disposable 
income, and that there is a distribution of saving rates across individuals within each 
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income class. We prove mathematically that the horizontal redistribution leads to in- 
creased total saving. Set . 1. applies the analysis of Sec. 1 to cross-section data on household 
saving behavior, and estimates the increase in aggregate saving that would follow tax 
conversion ifthe simplifying assumptions of Sec. 1 were valid. Sec. 3 generalizes Sec. 1 
by assuming that each person possesses a saving function, rather than a constant saving 
rate. While a person’s saving remains a function of his disposable income. his marginal 
and average propensities to save would no longer be constrained to be constant. We prove 
that, under fairly broad assumptions about these saving functions, a consumption tax once 
again leads to an increase in total saving. 
It is important to emphasize the limitations of the assumptions about saving behavior 
in this study. Ideally, one would want to examine horizontal redistribution on the as- 
sumption that each person is engaging in optimal life cycle behavior (recognizing the taste 
for bequests, liquidity constraints, and uncertainty), and embed this optimizing behavior 
in a growth model so that the long-run, as well as short-run, impact can be ascertained. 
Such an analysis would consistently combine both the net return effect, and the horizontal 
redistribution effect. 
Instead, this study begins the investigation of horizontal redistribution by assuming the 
simpler, myopic, nonoptimizing saving function, in which saving depends solely on current 
disposable income, and is unaffected by its net return. Moreover, only the short-run impact 
on aggregate saving is addressed. The estimate in Sec. 2 based on actual cross-section 
data should therefore be regarded as illustrative, rather than as a forecast of what would 
occur under tax conversion. 
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, our investigation suggests that the previously 
neglected horizontal redistribution effect might significantly increase aggregate saving. 
Further analysis in the context of a model that incorporates optimizing household behavior 
and economic growth is therefore warranted. 
I. HORIZONTAL REDISTRIBUTION WITH CONSTANT SAVING RATES 
When an income tax is converted to a consumption tax of equal progressivity-so that 
aggregate tax revenue from each income class is held constant-aggregate saving may 
alter for two distinct reasons: 
(1) the change in the ratio of future to present consumption confronting each household 
(equivalently, the change in the net return to saving); 
(2) the shift in disposable income from low savers to high savers within each income 
class-“the horizontal redistribution effect.” 
To isolate the potential impact of horizontal redistribution on aggregate saving, we will 
make the following simplifying assumptions in this section: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Each person has a constant saving rate, s, out of disposable (after-tax) income. This 
implies that only current disposable income affects a person’s saving. Thus, saving 
is inelastic with respect to its net return; and does not depend on currently held 
assets, or expected future earnings, in contrast to the life cycle or permanent income 
hypotheses. Moreover. for each person, the marginal propensity to save (MPS) 
equals his average propensity to save (AI’S). 
Tax substitution has no effect on a person’s before-tax income. 
There is a distribution of saving rates across individuals with the same income (all 
persons do not have the same saving rate, s). 
Given these assumptions, we will prove that replacing an income tax by a consumption 
tax that raises the same total tax revenue from a given income class must raise aggregate 
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saving from that class. The intuition is that the tax substitution shifts disposable income 
from persons with an s less than some so to persons with an s greater than Jo, so that the 
increased saving of the gainers exceeds the decreased saving of the losers. 
The assumption that each person’s MPS equals his APS is important. The tax substi- 
tution shifts disposable income from low APS to high APS persons. Whether aggregate 
saving increases, however, depends on whether the MPS of the gainers exceeds the MPS 
of the losers. A constant saving rate for each person, implying that APS equals MPS, is 
sufficient to assure this. Sec. 3 relaxes this assumption, and provides weaker conditions 
still sufficient to assure an increase in aggregate saving. 
Let Y be the before-tax income of each of the N persons in the income class. Let f(s) 
be the density function of saving rates across persons in the class. It will be useful to 
define: 
r?(s) = t,.C(s)iY 
t,C(s> = the consumption tax paid by a person with consumption C(s) 
Therefore t,.(s) will be called “the equivalent income tax rate” of the consumption tas 
on a person with saving rate s. We now show that ly(s) is strictly decreasing in s. 
Under the consumption tax, the person’s budget constraint is: 
Y=C+t,C+S 
t, = the consumption tax rate 
C = consumption 
S = saving 
The person has a constant saving rate s out of disposable income 
s = S/(Y - r,c). 
Combining (1.1) and (1.2) yields: 
f?(S) = $ = t,(l - s) 1 
1 + (1 - s)t, = 1 -I- I/( 1 - s)r,. . 
(I.11 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
The last expression in (1.3) shows clearly that r_“(s) is strictly decreasing in s. 
Let r,. be the income tax rate (independent of s). Then total tax revenue from the income 
class under each tax is given by: 
T, = r, YNf(s) ds 
T,. = r_ds) YNf(s) ds 
Ty = total tax revenue from the income class under the income tax 
T, = total tax revenue from the income class under the consumption tax. 
(1.4) 
(1.5) 
The constraint that Ty = T, implies: 
I {ty - r,Js)) f(s) ds = 0. (1.6) 
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Here we assume a tC exists so that (1.6) can be met. A proof is given in the Appendix 
to Sec. 3, which covers the present case so long as all persons have s < 1. 
We want to prove that tax substitution must raise aggregate saving from the income 
class. Aggregate saving under each tax is given by: 
s, = 
SC = 
s,. = 
s,. = 
s(l - t,) YiVfb) ds (1.7) 
I 
s{ 1 - t!(s)} YNf(s) ds (1.8) 
total saving from the income class under the income tax 
total saving from the income class under the consumption tax. 
We seek to prove that S, > S,., or, from (1.7) and (1.8): 
df,. - b(s)> YNf(s) ds > 0. (1.9) 
Equation (1.9) has a clear interpretation. {t? - t?(s)} Y is the change in disposable 
income from tax substitution for a person with saving rate s. ~{t,. - t,.(s)}Y is therefore 
the change in saving for a person with rate s. Nf(s)Js is the number of persons with a 
saving rate in the interval of length ils around s. Therefore, integrating over all saving 
rates yields the net change in saving over all persons in the income class. 
It will be convenient to divide (1.9) by YN, yielding: 
s{t! - t&)} f(s) ds > 0. (1.10) 
To prove that (1.6) implies (1. IO), we prove the following theorem: 
THEOREM 1.1 Suppose g(s) and h(s) are continuous 
the mean value of h(s) is 0: 
I h(s)f(s) ds = 0, 
where f(s) is a density function (thus, the distribution 
point). Then the mean value of g(s)Iz(s) is positive: 
of s is not concentrated at one 
g(s)h(s)f(s) ds > 0. (1.12) 
and strictly increasing, and that 
(1.11) 
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Since the mean value of h(s) is 0, and h(s) 
is continuous, there is an so such that h(so) = 0. Since g(s) is increasing, smaller values 
of g(s) will multiply h(s) for s < so than for s > so, so that (1.12) will be positive. The 
proof now follows: 
I s(s)h(s)f(s) ds = I s(so)&)f(s) ds + I {g(s) - gbo)Vz(s)fb) ds. (1.13) 
Since g(so) is a constant, the first term on the right of (1.13) is zero by (1.11). The 
second term is the mean value of k(s) = {g(s) - g(so)}h(s), which must be positive, since 
k(s) is always positive except at s = so. To see this, note that since g(s) and h(s) are both 
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strictly increasing. then for s < s0 both g(s) - gtso) and I!(s) are negativ.2. and for s > 
s0 both are positive. (Note: If the probability were concentrated at 50. where k(s) = 0. 
then and only then vvould the mean value of g(s)il(s) be 0). Q.E.D. 
.‘\pplying the theorem to (1.6) and (1.10). ifs = JO(S) and I, - t,(.s) = it(s). then both 
are strictly increasing (since t,,(s) is strictly decreasing), and from (1.6). the mean value 
of /I(S) is zero. Thus, the inequality in (1.10) follo\vs directly from the theorem. 
2. AN APPLICATION TO HOUSEHOLD CROSS-SECTION DATA 
The Sllt-\-ey of Chtrrzges in Fclrni1.y Finnnces (1968). a study authorized by the Federal 
Reserve System. and conducted by Dorothy Projector and other researchers. is a rich 
source of household data that has been used in many subsequent studies. The Slrr~~> 
groups all households into income classes. where each class has a range of values for 
before-tax income and a corresponding range for disposable income. For each income 
class, the survey provides a distribution of saving across households, so that a density 
function of saving rates, f/(s), can be inferred for each income classj (j = I to 8). 
The purpose of this section is to estimate the increase in aggregate saving that would 
have resulted from tax substitution in the U. S. in 1963 (the year to which the data apply) 
if the behavioral assumptions of Sec. 1 were valid. Because the assumptions of Sec. I 
should surely be questioned, this estimate should be regarded as illustrative of the possible 
magnitude of the horizontal redistribution effect. rather than empirically accurate. 
The particular tax substitution to be analyzed is the replacement of the income tax by 
an “equally progressive” consumption tax. By this we mean that the total tax revenue 
raised from each income class j is held constant. Thus, the tax burden is horizontally 
redistributed among households within each income class: however, there is no vertical 
redistribution of the tax burden among income classes. 
The Slrrrrey interviewed each household twice, concerning assets and liabilities on two 
dates, one year apart (December 31, 1962, and 1963). Saving was defined as the change 
in net worth over the year (the sum of the changes in net worth in each category of wealth). 
A detailed description of the data is described in the Sil1-vey. It should be noted that capital 
gains and losses (pure revaluations) are excluded, so that measured saving corresponds 
to saving in the national income accounts (which excludes capital gains and losses). 
Data from the Slrrrey on the distribution of saving for each of eight income classes are 
presented in Table 1. Within each class, Table 1 reveals a substantial dispersion in saving. 
For example, for households in the income class with disposable income S2j,OOO-$49,999 
(very affluent in 1963), 23% saved more than 525,000. while 20% dissaved more than 
SS,OOO. Part of the dispersion is probably due to variation in age, and therefore, stage of 
the life cycle; part, to variation in the taste for thrift, accumulation. and bequests. The 
source of this variation is not pursued in this study. 
The important assumptions and main steps of our procedure for estimating the change 
in saving under a consumption tax will now be described. Details are given in Appendix 
A. 
For each income class (row j), and each saving class (column i), the absolute dollar 
saving in Table 1 is converted into a saving rate for cell ij by dividing by the mean disposable 
income of classj. It is then assumed that the density function for classj, fj(s), is piecewise 
uniform, that is, within each of the fourteen saving rate cells, the density function in cell 
i is k;,, a constant. The value of k, is set so that the share of the total population of class 
j in cell ij equals the percentage presented in Table 1. Specifically, kij is obtained from 
kij ds = I, i = 1.. . 14, j = 1.. .8. (2.1) 
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I, = the fraction of all households in income class j whose saving rate lies in the 
interval i with endpoints s,_ ,,i and s,,,. Ii1 is presented in Table 1. 
For each income classj, data on the income tax rate, ti.1. is given in the Survey, so that 
total income tax revenue for the class, T,,j, is obtained from (1.3). since the mean before- 
tax income, Yj. and number of households LVj, are given. 
The next step is to find the consumption tax rate, t,,, that achieves a total tax revenue 
T,.,j equal to T,,,. To do this, we substitute (1.3) into (1.6), obtaining for classj: 
(2.2) 
Replacing fj(s) by the piecewise uniform kij: 
1 
I., 1 + (1 -sp,,j ds -: kj J1:;;,, l + /_ s)r,-,j ds (2.:) i=l 1 
The two integrals needed to evaluate (2.3) are: 
1 
1 + (1 - s)t, 
ds = - iIn/ 1 + (1 - s)t,( (2.4) 
L 
I l + cl’- sJt, ds = ii1 + (1 - s)t, - (1 + t,) In ) I + (1 - s)t,. 1 }. 
(2.5) 
c ‘ 
Our procedure is to select an initial value for t,,j, and then calculate the tyj given by 
(2.3), which will differ from the actual t,,j (given by the Surve)‘) on the first iteration. 
Based on the discrepancy, t,,j is then adjusted for the next iteration. At most, several 
iterations are required to reduce the discrepancy below .OOl. 
Given the required tCJ, and the piecewise uniform density function kij, aggregate saving 
under each tax can be computed for each class from (1.7) and (1.8) using (1.3) and (2.5). 
Table 2 presents the results for S,,j and S,,j for each classj, and compares aggregate 
saving under the two taxes, S, and S,. Replacing the income tax with an equally pro- 
gressive consumption tax--given the behavioral assumptions of Sec. l-would have 
Table 3. The increase in saving due to horizontal redistribution 
Disposable 
Income Class j 
(Mean 0,) 
Number of Saving Under 
Households Y-Tax, S, 
Saving Under 
C-Tax. 5, 
Percent Increase 
in Saving 
51,603 (I) 
3,974 (I!) 
6.185 (3) 
8,663 (4) 
I 1.887 (5) 
18,461 (6) 
32,540 (7) 
65,627 (8) 
16.2 I 
12.91 
12.97 
8.57 
5.38 
.98 
.64 
.23 
57.89 
- 52.428 
5.559 
12.669 
15.191 
14.806 
4.298 
6.637 
’ 376 - 
59.058” 
- $1.094 13.7 
6.198 I I.5 
13.502 6.6 
16.273 7.1 
16.044 8.4 
4.675 8.8 
8.028 21.0 
2.851 22.6 
65.478 10.9 
Number of households is in millions: saving is in billions of dollars. 
* The discrepancy between S59.058 billion, and the $56.3 billion reported in Table 5. p. IO of the &rn~y is 
explained in the Appendix. 
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raised aggregate saving in the U. S. in 1963 approximately 117~. and the saving of the 
two most affluent classes by 23% and 21%. respectively. 
3. A MORE GENERAL MODEL 
We now dispense with the assumption that each person possesses a constant MPS. 
Rather, we assume each person has a saving function, which gives his current savings 
from his current disposable income in some general fashion. Since saving still depends 
only on current disposable income. we still have a myopic model in which life cycle 
optimization is not considered. Under fairly broad assumptions about the nature of such 
“disposable income” saving functions, we show that the effect of horizontal redistribution 
of disposable income through a consumption tax is, once again, an increase in total saving. 
In Sec. 1 we assumed that the probability distribution of saving rates could be given 
by a density function f(s). This implied that the distribution was a continuous distribution; 
it could not, say, be concentrated discretely at a finite number of points. We now generalize 
by assuming the distribution of saving functions satisfies some general probability measure 
CL. This F may be continuous, or discrete, or some mixture of the two. The mean value 
of a function h will now be written J h dp. rather than J k(s)f(s) ds. Also, we will generally 
not require that our functions be differentiable. 
We assume that our saving functions come from a one parameter class {G,} with s the 
parameter. If a person has the function corresponding to parameter value s, , and he has 
current disposable income X, then he saves the amount G,,(X), which may be positive 
S 
Yd 
G 
Fig. I. 
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or negative. It is important to realize that although the letters is meant to suggest saving, 
it is merely a parameter nova. It’s actual value does not stand for either the .1lPS or the 
APS of that person for any particular disposable income. 
The assumption that the class of saving functions has only one parameter is perhaps 
unreasonably restrictive economically. Under certain conditions. our results remain true 
with any number of parameters. We say a bit more about this at the end of the section. 
Our hypotheses are as follows: 
HO. 
Hl. 
HZ. 
H3. 
H4. 
H5. 
H6. 
Before-tax income Y is fixed and positive for all persons considered; Y is unaffected 
by any tax. 
There is a one parameter family of saving functions {G,}, giving saving as a function 
of current disposable income, and every member of the Y income class saves ac- 
cording to one of these functions. The domain of the parameter s is some interval I. 
The frequency distribution of the functions G, is given by a probability measure t_~ 
on I. It is assumed that I.L is not concentrated entirely at one point, i.e., not ail persons 
share the same saving function. 
Each G, is a convex function. This is equivalent to the statement hat on each saving 
function, MPS never decreases as disposable income increases. It also implies that 
each G, is continuous (but not necessarily everywhere differentiable). 
For all s E I and X > 0, X - G,,(X) > 0. Also, there is a bound M such that for all 
s E I and all X 5 Y, X - G,(X) 5 M. Since X - G,(X) is the amount someone 
with parameter s plans to consume out of disposable income X. the first sentence 
says that no one plans on nonpositive consumption. and the second sentence says 
that no one (in the Y income class) plans to consume more than M. M may be much 
greater than Y, so this condition in no way excludes dissaving.” 
Ifs? > s ,, then for all X, G,,(X) > G,,(X). That is, at any disposable income level, 
a higher parameter implies greater savings, or equivalently, higher APS. 
For each s and X, the MPS on G, at X is strictly less than 1. Without differentiability, 
this means that for all S, X, and LX. 
G.,(X + 1x) - G,(X) 
!!J 
< 1. With differentiability, 
it means G.:.(X) < 1. 
Ifs- > si, then for all X, MPS on G.,: at X is greater than MPS on G,, at X. Without 
differentiability, this means: if s1 > s,, then for all X and rlX, 
Gp(X + AX) - Gp(X) > G,,(X + AX) - G,,(X) 
AX AX 
With differentiability, it means: if s2 > s,, then for all X, 
G:: (X) > G:, (X). 
Figure 1 illustrates several of these hypotheses and will also be used to clarify the key 
step in the proof of Theorem 3.5. The two curves are the graphs of some G,? and G,,, 
* Note that the second sentence of H3 applies even when X 5 0. This generality is needed because, just as 
C 2 Y for some people, so under a high consumption ta.x might some people have 7 = r,-C 2 Y. that is, X = 
Y - T 5 0. Therefore, one should ask: why restrict X 1 O-in sentence one of H3? The answer is: because 
otherwise H3 contradicts H2 and H5. It turns out. as it should. that for each person C > 0 even though G,(X) 
2 X for some X 5 0; that is. the hypotheses mathematically conspire to insure that such an economically 
impossible X is never attained. See the end of the proof of Theorem 3. I in Appendix B. 
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where s2 > s,. P is the point (X. G,,(X)). R is the point (X. G,,(X)), and so on. That the 
graph of G,? is everywhere above the graph of G,, illustrates H4. That the slope of RU 
is greater than the slope of PQ illustrates H6. That the slope of RV is greater than the 
slope of RU is an obvious consequence of H 2. Indeed if RV had lower slope than RU. 
then the intermediate point I/ would not be on or below RV as required by the geometric 
definition of convexity. (In order to make all curves and chords visually distinct in the 
figure, vertical distances have been magnified. Thus. there appear to be slopes greater 
than 1, contrary to HS, but there aren’t.) 
Let us note that the hypotheses in Sec. I are a special case of the hypotheses above. 
To assume that a person has a constant savings rate s is simply to assume that G,(X) = 
sX. It is easy to check that if each G, is defined in this way, where s < 1 for all permissible 
s, then HI through H6 are satisfied. 
We now come to our theorems. Theorem 3.5 is the main result. The proofs of Theorems 
3.1 to 3.4 are given in Appendix B. 
THEORE~I 3.1. There are well defined functions s(t,., s), C(t,, s) and T(t,-. s) which, 
for any t, 2 0 and any value of s in its domain I, give the savings, consumption, and 
consumption tax of an individual with saving function G, when the consumption tax rate 
is fc. In other words, given such t, and s, there are unique values S(t,., s), C(t,, s) and 
T(r,., s) such that 
Y = C(t,., s) + T(t,, s) + S(t,., s), (3.1) 
T(r,., s) = t, C(t,., s), (3.2) 
S(t,., s) = G,(Y - T(t,, s)). (3.3) 
THEOREM 3.2. For any fixed value of s, S(t,, s), C(t,, s) and T(t,., s) are continuous 
functions of t,. Moreover, C(t,., s) is strictly decreasing in t,. and T(r,., s) is strictly 
increasing in t,. Finally, if G, is (strictly) increasing, then s(t,, s) is (strictly) decreasing 
in t,. Now fix t, instead. For any t, 2 0, ,S(t,., s) is a strictly increasing function of s, 
and C(t,., s) is strictly decreasing. If t, > 0, T(t,, s) is strictly decreasing in s also. Finally, 
if for each X, G,(X) is a continuous function of s, then .S(t,, s), C(t,., s) and T(t,., s) are 
all continuous functions of s for any t, 2 0. 
Economically, the most interesting aspect of Theorem 3.2 is the conclusion that, even 
though C, the “base” on which Tis determined, decreases with increasing tc, nevertheless 
T increases. In short, there is no Laffer Curve effect. On the other hand, this theorem 
does not quite say that any income tax rate can be matched by a consumption tax rate, 
in the sense of equal total revenue. Perhaps the increasing T approaches a limit at a fraction 
of Y. The next theorem says this can’t happen. 
THEOREMS 3.3. For any income tax rate t,, with 0 5 t, < 1, there is a unique con- 
sumption tax rate t, 2 0 such that total tax revenue from the Y income class is the same 
under the two tax systems. 
In fact, we can say more. Let X, be the unique value for which G,(X,) = X,. By HZ, 
H3, and H5, such a unique X, exists for each s, and it is always nonpositive. 
THEOREM 3.4. lim T(t,, s) = Y - X,. Thus the limit on total tax revenue from the 
I‘--= 
Y income class as t, + = is NY - J X,N dp. 
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Nate: If G,(O) < 0. then X, is strictly negative. Thus a high enough 7, will cause a 
person with parameter value s to pay taxes T(t,, s) > Y. In short. with a consumption 
tax, a person can go into debt just to pay his taxes, a situation which cannot occur with 
an income tax. Put another way, disposable income can be negative. This justifies the 
concern for negative values of X which we showed in the footnote to H3. Conversely. if 
the first sentence of H3 were dropped and if for some person we had G,(Xi) = Xi, where 
Y 2 Xi > 0, then one can show that the limit on his consumption tax would be at most 
Y - Xi. (Intuitively this is because the person consumes nothing from the income Xi, 
hence cannot be taxed on it. Formally it follows because the proof of Theorem 3.4 does 
not depend on X, being negative.) For example, in the model of Sec. I, as long as s < 
1, then X, = 0. If anyone has s = 1, then none of his income is accessible to a consumption 
tax. In fact, if N, people in the Y income class have s = 1, then t? can be matched by 
t, if and only if t, < (N - N,)/N. This example is given by way of showing that H5 is 
necessary for Theorem 3.3. 
Henceforth let t, be arbitrary but fixed, with 0 5 t? < 1. Let fc be fixed at the rate 
which matches t,. Then S, C, and T become functions of s alone and may be written S(s). 
C(s), T(s). 
THEOREM 3.5. Let S, and S, be total saving in the Y income class under the con- 
sumption and income tax systems respectively. Then S,. > S,. 
Proof. Let T,, T, represent total tax revenue in the Y income class under the two 
systems. Let 
T = I, Y = the tax for each person under the income tax. 
Thus, 
Ty = TN = I TN dp, T,. = T(s)N d/J.. (3.4) 
Similarly, 
s, = G,(Y - TIN dk, s,. = S(s)N dp = G,(Y - T(s))N dk. (3.5) 
These last two displays correspond to (1.4), (1.5), (1.7), and (1.8). Dividing by N, the 
given T, = T, becomes 
(T - T(s)) dk = 0, (3.6) 
and what we wish to prove becomes 
I [G,( Y - T(s)) - G,(Y - T)l d/J. > 0. 
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) correspond to (1.6) and (1.10). Define 
g(s) = 
GAY - T(s)) - G,( Y - T) 
T - T(s) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
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If for some so. T(so) = T. then define g(so) to be the slope of any supporting line of 
G,,, at Y - T. i.e.. a line which touches the graph of G,, at [Y - T. G,,)( 1’ - T)]. and 
is never above it. It is well known that every convex function has a supporting line at 
every point; the line is unique if and only if the function is differentiable at the point, in 
which case the slope is the derivative. 
In any event. (3.7) now becomes 
I g(s) [T - T(s)1 dp. > 0. (3.9) 
which looks more like (1.10). We know from Theorem 3.2 that h(s) = T - T(s) is a strictly 
increasing function. We need only show that g(s) is strictly increasing and we will be done 
by Theorem 1.1. (Appendix B explains why Theorem 1.1 holds with a general probability 
measure and even if g(s) and h(s) are not continuous, as may be the case here.) 
Since [ Y - T(s)] - (Y - T) = T - T(s), g(s) is just the slope of the chord of G, over 
the disposable income interval from X = Y - T to X(s) = Y - T(s). Thus. if s2 > s,, 
and if we set Xi = X(s I ). X2 = X(sZ), then g(sZ) is the slope of segment RV in Fig. 1, 
and g(si) is the slope of PQ. Thus g(S,) > g(S,) by H2. and H6, as explained when the 
figure was introduced. That is, g is strictly increasing. (Actually, Fig. I covers only the 
case where both T(s,), T(sz) < T. Cases where one or more of T(s,), T(s2) equal T or 
are more than T are handled similarly using figures where one or more of Xi, X2 are at 
or left of X. When, say, T(s,) = T, one must use the fact that for a convex function, 
every chord with left end over X has slope at least as great as every supporting line at 
X.) Q.E.D. . 
As stated earlier, the one parameter assumption Hl is not essential. If saving is a 
multiparameter function of disposable income, in order for our results to remain true it 
suffices that H4 and H6 be true in each parameter separately, and that the probability 
distribution on the parameter tuples be the product of distributions on the parameters 
separately. Then the theorems stating monotonicity of various functions of the parameter 
s become statements about each parameter separately. The proof of Theorem 3.5 now 
requires integrating out one parameter at a time and the use of a further generalization 
of Theorem 1.1 in which the mean of h(s) need not be 0. The basic spirit and intuitions 
of the arguments remain the same. 
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting two related questions which we are 
pursuing in subsequent papers. First, within an income class, conversion from an income 
tax to a consumption tax of equal yield causes some persons to experience a tax increase, 
others a tax decrease. What fraction have their taxes increased? In particular, is the 
fraction greater than half? 
Second, there is a problem computing G,( Yd), savings under a consumption tax, be- 
cause there is a problem computing Y” = Y - T. In the income tax case, one can compute 
T directly from Y and then plug into G, ; in the consumption tax case, we give (in Appendix 
B) an existential proof that there is a unique S satisfying (3.1)-(3.3), but we don’t indicate 
how an individual might reasonably expect to find that S. We are looking at several ways 
to modify the usual withholding scheme for income tax to make it apply to a consumption 
tax. Sometimes these methods provide an interative computation of S, but sometimes 
they “blow up”. 
4. CONCLUSION 
If an income tax is replaced by a consumption tax of equal progressivity and equal 
total yield, within each income class disposable income will be shifted from “low savers” 
to “high savers.” It therefore seems plausible that this “horizontal redistribution” will 
increase aggregate saving. The “horizontal redistribution effect” has been largely neg- 
lected in previous analyses of consumption vs. income tax. Whether or not the interest 
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elasticity of saving is positive for each individual, the horizontal redistribution effect makes 
it likely that conversion of an income to a consumption tax of equal progressivity would 
raise aggregate saving. 
This paper explores the horizontal redistribution effect on the assumption that each 
individual’s saving is a function of his current disposable income, and that the functions 
are not identical for all persons. We prove that, for such nonidentical “disposable income” 
saving functions, with certain properties, conversion of an income to a consumption tas 
must raise aggregate saving through the horizontal redistribution effect. 
As an illustrative calculation, we estimate that $actual cross-section data on household 
saving were generated by saving functions in which each household has a constant saving 
rate out of current disposable income-an assumption that can surely be questioned- 
then conversion of an income to a consumption tax bvould have raised aggregate household 
saving through the horizontal redistribution effect by approximately 11 percent in 1963. 
The analysis is limited to the class of “disposable income” saving functions. It would 
be important to extend the analysis to saving behavior governed by life cycle optimization 
(constrained by liquidity, uncertainty, and taste for bequests), to determine whether hor- 
izontal redistribution is still likely to increase aggregate saving. 
APPENDIX A 
Table A-l presents the data used in the calculation in Sec. 2. Each variable, and the table and 
page in the Survey from which it is taken, is indicated below: 
s, = 
N, = 
D, = 
Y; = 
t_v,j = 
lij = 
Table 
the upper limit of saving category i ($), i = 1 II. (Table S-l, page 106) 
the number of households in income class j (millions), j = I . . . S. Derived from Table 
5, p. IO; the 3.2 percent for the $15,000 and over class in Table 5 was assumed to be 1.7 
percent for $35,000-$24,999, 1. I percent for $25.000-$49,000, and 0.4 percent for 550,000 
and over. 
mean disposable income in income classj (Table S-17, p. 316) 
mean before-tax income in income classj (Table S-17, p. 316) 
mean income tax rate in income class j, i.e., I - (0,/Y,) (described on p. 50). 
the percentage of all households in income class; in saving cell i, i = I 14, j = I 
8 (Table S-l, p. 106). 
A-2 presents the saving rate matrix. s,,, derived from Table A- I. s,, is given by: 
s,/ = S,lD, i = 0.. 14. (A.!) 
Table .4-l. Survey data 
1 
s N TY D Y 
- 5000 
- 1000 
- 500 
- 100 
-I 
IO0 
500 
1000 
300 
3000 
10000 
3000 
16.21 .0349 1603 1661 
11.91 .0788 3974 4314 
12.97 .I08 6185 6934 
8.57 .I'61 8663 9916 
5.38 .I475 11887 13943 
.98 .I856 18461 22667 
.64 .2703 32540 43593 
.23 .1127 68627 II6851 
.Ol 
.06 
.08 
.I4 
-07 
.22 
I? 
:I6 
.08 
.05 
.Ol 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
.Ol 
.06 
.07 
.09 
.0-l 
.03 
.07 
.I7 
.'I 
.I6 
.05 
.Ol 
.02 
0.00 
.Ol .03 
.05 .05 
.03 .03 
.04 .02 
.0-I .Ol 
.02 .Ol 
.03 .02 
.I7 .07 
.I9 .II 
.3l .33 
.I .23 
.Ol .05 
.01 .03 
0.00 0.00 
.03 
.05 
.03 
.O:! 
.03 
0.00 
.02 
.06 
.08 
.23 
.25 
.I3 
.06 
.Ol 
.03 -J .2-l 
.07 :02 .O? 
.03 0.00 .Ol 
.02 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
.Ol 0.00 0.00 
.03 .Ol 0.00 
.01 0.00 .Ol 
.I7 .07 25 
.2-l .03 .Ol 
.25 .?I .Ol 
.08 .23 .I3 
.04 .23 .32 
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The lowest saving cell, i = 0. does not have its bottom limit. s “., . specified. Similarly. the highest 
saving cell, i = 1-t. does not have its top limit, s,,,,, specified. Because these limits are required 
to calculate X-r,j and X-,l,,, we specify: 
s “., = Sl., - 0.2 (A.?) 
S1-I.i = 5lj.j + 0.~. (X.3) 
For several cells representing low-income and high saving, the si, computed by (A. I) exceeded 
I. ‘4 saving rate based on national income account saving should not exceed I, because this would 
imply negative consumption. As expected. few households occupied these cells. But a small fraction 
did. probably because measured disposable income may be less than true disposable income due 
to certain exclusions, such as transfer payments. It was assumed that the genuine saving rate did 
not exceed 0.9 for any cell, so that if the rate, s rl,, given by (A.3) exceeded 1.0, it was lowered to 
0.9. In addition, ifs 11.~ was set at 0.9, it was assumed that ~~3.~ did not exceed ,089: s12.,, 0.88, and 
so on. As long as the values given by (A. I)-(A.3) were consistent with these limits. they were used 
without adjustment. Only a small minority of cells were affected by the ceilings. as can be seen in 
Table A-2. By checking the I, matrix in Table A- I, it can be seen that these adjusted cells constitute 
only a very small fraction of households. Finally, the ceilings reduce the dispersion in saving rates. 
and therefore tend to reduce the increase in aggregate saving calculated in Sec. 3. 
Table A-3 presents the matrix of density function segments, X-,, derived from (2.1). for i = I 
I4 (k;j = liji(Si,j - St_ I,;)). 
Evaluation of (2.3), using (2.4) and (2.5), proceeds as follows. The first and second summations 
in (2.3) are: 
Aj = ( > -;’ 2 f,In# C./ i= I I (A.4) 
Bj = ($1 ,=, lJ( 2 k- {Qi., - Qi-1.j) - (1 + fc,j) In #) , 
Q;.j = 1 + (1 - J,.,)lc,j 
Qt-g.j = I + (1 - Si-I.j)rc,j. (A.51 
Then the income tax rate, t,.,,, that will raise the same revenue as tc,j from income class j is: 
ty.j = ?,.,(A, - Bj). (‘4.6) 
Table A-2. Saving rate matrix 
i\j I 
0 -3.3191516 
I -3.1191516 
2 -.6238303 
3 -.3119152 
4 -.06-'3830 
- 
2 -.0006238 . 06238 
7 .0623830 
8 .3119152 
9 .6238303 
IO .8600000 
II .8700000 
IZ .8800000 
I3 .8900000 
I4 .9000000 
-1.4581782 - 1.0084074 -.7771673 -.6206?76 -.3708412 
-1.2581782 -.8084071 -2771673 -.4706176 -2708412 
-2516356 -.I616815 -.I154335 -.08412.55 -.0541687 
-.I258178 -.0808407 -.0577167 -.0420628 -.0270841 
-.0251636 -.0161681 -.Ollj433 -.0064126 -.0054168 
-.0002516 -.0001617 -.OOOlI54 -.0000841 -.0000542 
.0002516 .OOOl617 .OOOll54 .0000841 .000054?. 
.0251636 .0161681 .Oll5433 .0084126 .0054168 
.1X3178 .0808407 .0577167 .0420628 .0270841 
.X16356 .I616815 .I154335 .0841255 .0541682 
.6290891 .4041037 2885836 .3103138 .I354206 
.8700000 .808407-J .5771673 .4206276 .2708-!12 
.8800000 .8800000 .8800000 .8412552 .5416825 
.8900000 .8900000 .8900000 .8900000 .8900000 
.9000000 .9000000 .9000000 .9000000 .9000000 
sss , 8 
-.3536370 -.2738976 
-.I536570 -.0728576 
-.0307314 -.0145715 
-.0153657 -.007X+58 
-.0030731 -.0014572 
-.0000307 -.0000146 
.0000307 .0000146 
.0030731 .0014572 
.0153657 .0072858 
.0307314 .0145715 
.0768285 .0364288 
.I536570 .0728576 
.3073141 .I457152 
.76828X! .364288l 
.9000000 .5642881 
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Table A-3. Density function matrix 
IIY 
Aj I. K 8 
I .Oj 
2 .0’404i 
3 .256JS 
1 .i6105 
: 176.33 I.1334 
7 I.943 
8 ,641: 
9 ,256-lY 
IO .‘I171 
II I.0 
I2 0.0 
I3 0.0 
I-l 0.0 
.05 
.0596 I 
.jS636 
.89415 
I .6057 
59.61 
2.8099 
I.689 
1.6691 
.A2389 
20755 
I.0 
2.0 
0.0 
.O? 
.077311 
.3711 
.6185 
2.499 
61.85 
I .87-17 
2.6286 
2.3503 
I .‘782 
.I?174 
.I3968 
I.0 
0.0 
.I? Ii .I5 
.I0829 I1859 .33307 
.il978 :71323 I.1077 
,433 I5 .5943i .92305 
.87505 3.601 I 0.0 
-13.315 0.0 0.0 
I.7501 2.1014 I .S647 
I.516 I.783 I .3846 
I .9059 1.9019 I .J769 
I .9059 I .8227 2.0922 
.83165 I.1857 I .7723 
.I651 I .30906 .92305 
3.0 I .?309 ,296s 
0.0 I.0 -1.0 
I .o I.2 
I627 
0:o 
.3-!3ll 
I .3725 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
2135 0.0 
0.0 I .3721 
I.5185 I I I.438 
.39048 .I745 I 
I .3667 .I3725 
.-19895 .Ii9477 
I .7462 1.6 
We performed the first iteration by choosing the initial I,,j,i = Z.St,,,,,, where t\.,,,<, is the actual 
income tax rate given by the S~~rtey. The t,,,,, using (A.6) in general differed from ty,j,,. If the 
discrepancy exceeded ,001, we chose tc.j.2 for the second iteration as follows: 
tc.j.21tc.j.l = ty.j.olty,j.l. (A.7) 
Several iterations proved sufficient to reduce the discrepancy below .OOi. S,., is calculated from 
(1.7) as follows: 
S,,j = (1 - tv.j)Y,Nj Sfj(S) ds = (I - ty,,) Yj!V,s,n,, (A.S) 
sm,j = mean saving rate in class J 
(A.9) 
S,,, is calculated by substituting (I .3) into (I.@, and using (2.5): 
S,-,j = YIN, I S 1 + (I - s)t,.,, fj(S) ds = Y, NIB, 
where Bj is given by (A.5). 
(A. IO) 
By using the same piecewise uniform density function, k,, to calculate Sx,j as SC,, , saving under 
the two taxes can be consistently compared. Because the assumption of a constant ki, is not perfectly 
accurate, our calculated S?,j, and total S,., differs slightly from the actual S,,, and S,” reported in 
Table 5, p. IO of the S~r~e_v. For example, our S,. of $59.058 billion reported in Table 2 differs 
somewhat from the actual $56.2 billion reported for 1963 by the Survey. The percentage error was 
similar in each of the eight income classes. 
APPENDIX B 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. From (3.2) and (3.3), if C(r,, s) is uniquely defined. then so are T(t,., s) 
and s(t,, s). Also, (3.1) may be rewritten as Y = (I + t,) C(t,, s) + G,( Y - t,C(t,, s)). Fix t, 
and s arbitrarily. Define 
H(C) = (I + t,) C + G,(Y - t,C). 03.1) 
270 STEPHEY B. M-\L.RER .AND LXLRESCE S. SEIDVAC 
Wr will show that there is a unique value of C for which H(C) = I’. Then this C is the unique 
choice for C(t,.. s). 
To show that H(C) = I’has a unique solution. note first that H(C) is a strictly increasing function 
with average slope greater than I on any interval: for AC > 0, G,( Y - I,( C f AC)) - G,( Y - 
t,.C) > -r,1C by H5, so 
H(C + 1;’ - H(C) > , 
f t,. - t, = I. (B.2) 
Moreover, H(0) = G,( Y) < Y by the first sentence of H3. So by (B.2). for C = Y - G,( Y). H(C) 
> Y. Also, H is a continuous function. since G, is continuous. Thus H(C) = Y for exactly one C 
(at least one by the Intermediate Value Theorem for continuous functions. at most one since H is 
strictly increasing). Note that this C(t,, s) is in fact positive. 
Prooj’uf Theorem 3.2. Fix s. Once we prove that C(t,.. s) is continuous in t,, then T(t,., s) and 
S(t,., s) are continuous in t,. by (3.2) and (3.3). Consider some t, and set Co = C(t,., s). Then 
Y = (I + t,.)C,> + G,( Y - r,.C,). (B.3) 
Temporarily consider the right hand side of (B.3) as a function of tc alone. i.e.. hold Co fixed. This 
function is continuous, so for any E there is a 6 such that changing t,. by at most 6 changes the right 
hand side by at most E. Thus, by (B.2), we must next change Co by less than E to make both sides 
of (B.3) equal again. In short, any change of I, by at most 6 causes C(t,., s) to change by less than 
E. By definition then, C(t,.. s) is continuous in t,.. 
To get that C(t,, s) is a strictly decreasing function of t,, again consider (B.3). again leave CO 
fixed, and now increase t,. by some positive amount At. Since C,, is positive, H5 tells us that the 
right hand side of (B.3) changes by a positive amount. Since AH/AC > 0. Co must be decreased 
to make both sides of (B.3) equal again. 
To prove that T(t,, s) is strictly increasing in t,., consider some t,. > 0 and set To = T(t,., s). 
Now rewrite (B.3) as 
Y= 
i > 
+ + I To + G,( Y - To). (B.4) 
‘ 
Much as before, we get from H5 that if To is strictly increased while t, is held fixed, then the right 
hand side of (B.4) is strictly increased; however, if tc is strictly increased while To is held fixed, 
then the right hand side is strictly decreased. Thus if tc is strictly increased, T(t,., s) must strictly 
increase to maintain the equality in (B.4). (This analysis does not apply when t,. = 0. since (B.4) 
is not defined then. But by (3.2). 7(0, s) = 0, and for t, > 0, T(t,., s) > 0; thus T(t,.. s) is strictly 
increasing at t, = 0 too.) 
Finally, by (3.3), if G, is (strictly) increasing in X, then .S(t,., s) is (strictly) decreasing in t,.. 
NOW fix t, 2 0 and let s be the variable. Consider again (B.3). Ifs is strictly increased and CO 
held unchanged, then by H4 the right hand side is strictly increased. Thus to make the two sides 
equal whenever Co = C(t,., s), we must have that C(t,., s) is a strictly decreasing function. From 
(3.2) it is now immediate that T(t,, s) is a strictly decreasing function of s for t, > 0 and constant 
for tc = 0. Then, from (3.1), we get that S(t,, s) is strictly increasing in s for t, z 0. 
As for the claims of continuity in s if G,(X) is continuous s, note that the right hand side of 
(B.3) is now continuous ins when Co is fixed. The proof proceeds exactly like the previous continuity 
proof for t,-. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let T(t,) be total consumption tax revenue at rate 1,-: 
T(t,) = T(t,, s)N dp. (B.5) 
We need that T(t,) is well defined, continuous, and strictly increasing. In the real world case, p 
finite discrete, these things are both evident and easy to prove. However, for arbitrary p.. except 
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for the second sentence of H3 it is possible to choose the set {G,} so that dissaving increases so 
fast with decreasing s that T(r,) = x for every t,- > O! Given that sentence, we fmd that 
nr,. 5) = r,.C(T,, s) = f,.[(Y - T(f,.. s)) - GJY - T(f,. s))] 5 r,.u. (B.6) 
Since for each t,.. T(t,, S) is a decreasing nonnegative function of s, bounded by r,M. (B.5) is well 
defined and finite. Since T(r,, s) is strictly increasing in rc for each S, it is elementary that T(r,) is 
strictly increasing. The fact that. for all s, r(t,, s) is continuous in t,- and dominated by r,.,U implies. 
by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem (Royden, p. 88) that T(t,.) is continuous. 
Because T(f,.) is strictly increasing, there is at most one I,- for which 
T(f,) = T, = f?!C’Y. (B.7) 
Because T(f,.) is continuous. the Intermediate Value Theorem says there is at least one I, satisfying 
(B.7) SO long as T? is bracketed by two values of T(t, ). A lower bracket is given by 0 = 7(O) 5 
T,.. Let ? = lim T(t,.); we will show that T 2 N Y. Thus. since t, < I. T,. < ?. Therefore, TX 5 
I,--= 
T(r,.) for some t,., giving an upper bracket. 
So suppose ? < N Y. For each 5, let i., = lim T( r,., s). We have f = J T,N dk by the Monotone 
r,-r 
Convergence Theorem (Royden, p. 84) applied to (B.5). Thus i < N Y forces ?, < Y for some s. 
Fix s at such a value and consider 
C(f,. s) = (Y - T(r,., s)) - G,.( y - T(r,, 5)). (B.S) 
Since all functions in (B.8) are continuous in 1,. 
6, = lim C(r,., s) = (Y - i,) - G,(Y - i_,). (B.9) 
I(-.= 
Thus C., > 0: set X = Y - ?.s > 0 in the first sentence of H3. So, as I,- - 33. 7(f,. s) = 
f,-C(f,., s) grows without bound. This contradicts i, < Y. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Recall that X, = G,(X,) by definition; also, by H5, X > G,(X) if and 
only if X > X,. Let ?, i‘,, Cs be as in the previous proof. 
By Theorem 3.1, C(f,., s) > 0. Thus by (B.8), G,(Y - T(t,., s)) < Y - T(r,, s). That is. Y - 
T(t,.. s) > X,, i.e., T(t,, s) < Y - X,. Thus i, 5 Y - X,. Suppose f,s < Y - X,, i.e.. X, < Y - 
T,. Then by (B.9), C’, > 0, and i, = lim t,C(f,., s) = %, the same contradiction as before. So f, 
IL-Z 
= Y - X.,. Thus T = J (Y - X,)N dp. = N Y - J X,N dk. 
Finally, in the proof of Theorem 3.5 we used the following generalization of Theorem 1.1: 
THEOREM I .I’. Suppose g and /z are strictly increasing functions on I and p. is a probability 
measure on I not concentrated at a single point. Suppose J /I dp. = 0. Then J g II dp > 0. 
ProoJ Since /I cannot be strictly positive or strictly negative, even without continuity there is 
a unique s,) such that /r(s) < 0 for s < s0 and 11(s) > 0 for s > so. With this choice of sO, repeat 
the proof of Theorem I. I, starting with (1.13). replacing f(s) ds with db We still have QsO) = 0 
and X-(s) > 0 otherwise. Since p. is not concentrated entirely at sO, J X-(s) dp > 0. The only other 
use in the proof of Theorem 1.1 of the continuity of either g or Ir is the implicit assertion that all 
the integrals mentioned exist. In measure theory, all increasing functions and their products are 
automatically integrable, without assuming continuity. 
rlcX-non,leclgnlenr-We are grateful to Steve Franklin of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. who wrote 
the program for, and implemented the computer calculations in. Sec. 2: and to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, for the use of its computer facilities. 
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